

Ideology in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Lessons from combating Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia

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Part I: Introduction¹

Ideology is a powerful message that motivates and propels ordinary human beings into action. Ideology, a dynamic and an evolving belief system, is created by the interpretation of events by ideologues. Ideology, not poverty or illiteracy, is the key driver of politically motivated violence.² Ideology frames organizational structure, leadership and membership motivation, recruitment and support, and shapes the strategies and tactics adopted by the group.

Jihadi ideologues and group leaders craft their ideology by interpreting, reinterpreting or misinterpreting religion and politics. Ideology is used to attract and retain recruits as members, supporters and sympathizers. The personal history and worldview of an individual may make him or her more or less susceptible to a particular terrorist or extremist ideology.

Using ideology, contemporary Jihad groups recruit followers from a cross-section of society – the rich, the poor, the educated and the less educated. To generate both recruits and support, they indoctrinate their potential and existing support base. Ideology is inculcated by disseminating it in the form of information or propaganda using lectures, speeches, pronouncements, writings, etc.

To counter the threat posed by a group, its operational infrastructure must be dismantled and its conceptual infrastructure eroded. As terrorism is a vicious by-product of ideological extremism, government and society must develop an ideological response to make it difficult for terrorist groups to replenish their human losses and material wastage.

Framework

In the post-9/11 environment, the centrality of ideology in political violence, especially terrorism, has become increasingly evident both to analysts and to policy and decision makers.³ To counter terrorist ideology and to provide an alternative

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ideology, it is necessary to know its key ideologues, organizational structures, the evolving ideology, and the target audience – the community.

The Threat Landscape in Southeast Asia

To understand the appeal of a narrow segment of Southeast Asian Muslims to wage jihad, this paper will focus on the ideologies of al Qaeda and al Jemaah al Islamiyah (JI). The evolving ideologies of these two jihadi groups - advocating global and local jihad campaigns - have profoundly transformed the region's threat landscape.

Since its formation on September 10, 1988, al Qaeda, the chief proponent and practitioner of global Jihad, established a robust presence in Southeast Asia. Al Qaeda's unique ideology significantly influenced JI, a faction of Darul Islam, a local jihad group, into becoming a regional group with a global focus. Although operationally JI is still a regional group, its focus is identical to al Qaeda i.e. attacking targets of the US, its allies and friends. The ideological transformation of local and regional jihad groups to emulate al Qaeda's vision and mission of a global jihad is the most significant development in the post 9/11 environment.

Although the operational capability of al Qaeda has severely weakened during the past four years, the ideology of global jihad articulated by Bin Laden and his group serves as a catalyst for 30-40 Asian, Middle Eastern and African jihad groups and for numerous cells in the West. After al Qaeda's attacks on America's most iconic landmarks on 9/11, many jihadists increasingly view al Qaeda as a pathfinder, model for emulation, and the vanguard of the Islamic movement. In Southeast Asia, JI is increasingly seen as the model by existing and emerging local jihad groups. The major shapers of ideology in Southeast Asia are al Qaeda and JI.

Part II: Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda is a jihad organization with a global reach. In keeping its original mandate, its principal aim was to inspire and incite Islamic movements and the Muslim masses worldwide to attack those who threaten Islam and Muslims. In defence of Islam and its adherents, al Qaeda conducts attacks on iconic targets of the US, its allies and friends to inspire and instigate a perpetual campaign. Although al Qaeda does not enjoy widespread support among the Muslim masses worldwide, it seeks to exploit the anger, suffering and the resentment of Muslims against the United States. America's lack of understanding of the Muslim world – for instance its invasion of Iraq - has given a new lease of life to terrorism and extremism. Considering the support for the global jihad movement in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and elsewhere, the campaign has been a partial success. While al Qaeda conducted one major attack every year prior to 9/11, al Qaeda and its associated groups conducted one attack every three months after 9/11. Many of these groups today seek to emulate al Qaeda tactics, and more importantly believe in the global jihad. The most hunted terrorist group in history, has spawned several similar groups.

Al Qaeda inherited a global infrastructure from the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan mujahidin. Its real strength is not al Qaeda membership per se but its overarching highly appealing ideology. Instead of building support for al Qaeda the

group, it seeks to reinvigorate the global jihad movement.⁴ In addition to training its own members – 4,000 (October 2001 estimate, Western intelligence community), al Qaeda, Taliban and other groups trained 20,000 members in its camps in Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001. Most of the mujahidin that fought against the Soviets disagree with al Qaeda and its associated groups.

Today, al Qaeda's real power is the disparate groups it had trained, financed, armed and most importantly ideologized. The al Qaeda network (al Qaeda group + its associated groups) and ideologically affiliated cells comprise the al Qaeda movement. Since al Qaeda attacked America's most iconic landmarks, the threat posed by al Qaeda has been surpassed by the emergence of a global jihad movement, consisting of al Qaeda and other groups that advocate global jihad. The global jihad movement has four overlapping components.

First, al Qaeda group was established by Osama bin Laden, the unofficial representative of the Saudi Kingdom to the Afghan jihad. Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden's Palestinian-Jordanian mentor, was the ideological father of al Qaeda. The group's global jihad ideology has great appeal to both associated groups waging the local jihad in conflict zones and radicalized Muslim cells in the migrant and diaspora communities of the West. Also known as al Qaeda core, al Qaeda central or al Qaeda classic, post-9/11 al Qaeda group is operationally weak but ideologically potent.

Second, al Qaeda's operationally associated groups consist of an umbrella of 30-40 Asian, African, Middle Eastern groups. Also known as the al Qaeda network, al Qaeda provided these groups with training, weapons, finance and ideology in Pakistan, Sudan, and Afghanistan; in conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Minadano; and through the Internet. They hold declared or undeclared membership of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders formed in February 1998. They include the Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), Takfir Wal Hijra (TWH), Tawhid Wal Jihad (al Qaeda of the Two Rivers), Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), al Jamaah al Islamiyah (JI), and Abu Sayyaff Group (ASG).

Third, al Qaeda's ideologically affiliated cells. These are operationally unconnected to al Qaeda but driven by an ideology of global jihad articulated by it. "The Supporters al Qaeda"⁵ the cell responsible for the bombing of the trains in Madrid on March 11, 2001, and the disrupted British cell led by Omar Khayam⁶ were self financed and independent of al Qaeda's operational control. The post-Iraq robust Islamist milieu in North America, Europe and Australasia is transforming support cells to execution cells.

Fourth, Sunni groups operationally unconnected with al Qaeda but steadfastly advocating global jihad. This category could be violent or non violent, for instance extremist groups – Hezb-ut-Tehrir, al Mahajaron in the UK – and violent groups – Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam in Indonesia. Some of these groups have publicly criticized bin Laden and al Qaeda but they believe in global jihad.

As a result of US-led global action, al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden has severely weakened. Nonetheless, the high-impact 9/11 attack, US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, the media reporting on Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have strengthened support for likeminded associated groups and cells as well as Islamist groups unconnected to al Qaeda. Exploiting suffering, resentment and anger of the Muslims, the terrorist and extremist groups

are now able to replenish their human losses and material wastage and continue the fight. Al Qaeda has morphed from a group of 3-4000 members in October 2001 to a movement of several tens of thousands. Today, the global jihad movement, consisting primarily of Sunni groups connected or unconnected to al Qaeda, is even more robust.

The threat is not monolithic. The global jihadists present a multidimensional threat against the US, its allies and friends. The global jihadists challenge the infidel (non Muslim) and the apostate (Muslim) regimes. The threat is both ideological and kinetic.

Al Qaeda's History in brief

Osama bin Laden alias Osama Mohammad al Wahad alias Abu Abdallah alias al Aaqa was born in 1957. Son of the late Mohammad bin Awdah bin Laden from Yemen, bin Laden grew up in Saudi Arabia. His father became a construction magnate and renovated the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The richest non royal Saudi family, the Bin Ladens are highly respected by both the Saudi royal household and the public.

After graduating from University in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden became deeply religious and assisted the Islamist movement against the communists in Yemen. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, he arrived in Pakistan and subsequently in Afghanistan to assist the Afghan groups in their protracted campaign. In 1984, Dr Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Jordanian, who came to oppose the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, founded *Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab* (MAK), known commonly as the Afghan Service Bureau. MAK provided significant assistance to the Arab mujahidin and to their families. Bin Laden joined hands with Azzam, who became his mentor. As MAK's principal financier, Bin Laden was considered the deputy to Dr Azzam. At the height of the foreign Arab and Muslim influx into Pakistan-Afghanistan from 1984-1986, Bin Laden spent time traveling widely and raising funds in the Arab world. Azzam recruited several thousand Arab and Muslim youths to fight the Soviet presence, and bin Laden channelled several million dollars' worth of financial and material resources for the Afghan jihad. MAK operated independently of Western and Pakistani governments that assisted in the fight. MAK rarely interacted with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, but it tapped into the vast Muslim Brotherhood network and the resources of the Saudi government.⁷ The fighting and relief efforts were assisted by two banks – Dar al Mal al Islami, founded by Prince Mohammad Faisal in 1981 and Dalla al Baraka founded by King Fahd's brother-in-law in 1982. The banks channelled funds to 20 NGOs, the most famous of which was the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO). Both IIRO and the Islamic Relief Agency functioned under the umbrella of the World Islamic League led by Mufti Abdul Aziz bin Baz.

Immediately before the Soviets withdrew, Azzam and Bin Laden decided to form a vanguard group – al Qaeda al Sulbah - that could unite the whole Muslim world into a single entity. Azzam was the ideological father and the intellectual leader but gradually bin Laden took over.⁸ Bin Laden's initial worldview was shaped by Dr Azzam, formerly of the Muslim brothers. Towards the end of the anti-Soviet Afghan campaign, Bin Laden's relationship with Azzam deteriorated. The dispute over Azzam's support for Ahmad Shah Massoud, who later became the leader of the Northern Alliance, caused tension. Bin Laden preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,

former Prime Minister and leader of the Islamic Party (Hizb-i-Islami), who was both anti-communist and anti-western. Furthermore, together with the Egyptian members of al Qaeda, Bin Laden wished to support terrorist action against Egypt and other Muslim secular regimes. Having lived in Egypt, Azzam knew the price of such actions and opposed it vehemently. Azzam and bin Laden went their different ways. In Peshawar, Pakistan, Azzam was assassinated by the Egyptian members of al Qaeda.

Following his death, the ideological vacuum was filled by Dr Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. A professional medical practitioner and a qualified eye surgeon, Zawahiri became both bin Laden's doctor and mentor. After Azzam's death, bin Laden took over MAK and then transformed it. Using MAK trainers and camps, Bin Laden built al Qaeda. Al Zawahiri, a well known hardliner, became his deputy and the principal strategist of the jihad movement.

Before it was popularly known as such, al Qaeda is a concept attributed to Syed Qutb in his writing as "*al-qaedah al-sulbah*" (The Solid Base). This term refers to the successful early Muslim generation who received education and guidance from the Prophet Muhammad in the house of Arqam Bin Abi Arqam. They were companions of the Prophet whose devotion and commitment towards the Islamic struggle against Arab pagans were unparalleled by later generation. They became a source of inspiration and model for Muslims to emulate. Because of their success as well as testimony of their excellence by the Prophet. In conceptualizing al Qaeda, Azzam drew from the pages of Islamic history. In general, what he did was to define its composition, aims, and purpose in view of the struggle of an Islamist movement after the victory over the largest land army in the world – the Soviet military. While the concept was transformed to meet the changing landscapes it was never intended to be a terrorist organization.⁹

Al Qaeda's features under Osama Bin Laden

Al Qaeda is not a conventional organization but a transnational network. It does not rely on state sponsorship but multiple sources of support. It is a highly patient organization promoting a multigenerational campaign. These three characteristics made al Qaeda an unprecedented threat and an unpredictable adversary. The meticulous and exhaustive preparation of attacks makes al Qaeda truly unique. Unlike governments, al Qaeda is not event but campaign driven, making it a strategic threat. As al Qaeda makes careful preparations investing significant time and energy, without sound intelligence the timely prediction of its attacks is nearly impossible. Al Qaeda does not believe in immediate reaction to an attack carried out against it. Al Qaeda doctrine stipulates that it should always wield the initiative. Al Qaeda decides when and where to attack. After US fired 70 cruise missiles into Afghanistan in 1998, al Qaeda decided to strike America at home using US airplanes, an operation that would take three years to plan, prepare and execute.¹⁰

Immediately after September 11, al Qaeda planned to attack Heathrow airport using aircraft hijacked from Eastern Europe and US financial targets using UK as a launching pad. These plans were disrupted in Pakistan and UK. Two successive waves of strikes in London in July 2005 suggest the appeal of al Qaeda's call that "it is the duty of every good Muslim to wage jihad". Al Qaeda's real strength is to meticulously study the gaps in security and strike at targets that will have strategic implications.

Al Qaeda Ideologues

The founding charter of al Qaeda was formulated by Abdullah Azzam probably in late 1987 and early 1988 and published in Al Jihad, the principal journal of the Arab mujahidin in April 1988. He envisaged al Qaeda as an organization that would channel the energies of the mujahidin into fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslims worldwide, an Islamic “rapid reaction force”, ready to spring to the defence of their fellow believers at short notice. Azzam described his original concept:

“Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy task and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer, endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard constitutes Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah for the expected society.”¹¹

The forceful words articulated to shape the organization did not generalize the means to include terrorism. He was a firm believer that “the end does not justify the means”. Jihad as he saw it was invoked as a religious obligation in defence of Islam and Muslims against a defined enemy, not a speculative one. This is best demonstrated in the Afghan-Soviet war, to which he dedicated his life immediately before his death. Any attempt to speculate beyond this perimeter, would be out of proportion. Azzam rejected a proposal by MAK’s Egyptian members – Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, Abu Hafs alias Muhammed Atef, and subsequently Dr Ayman al Zawahiri - to utilize jihadi funds to train mujahidin in terrorist techniques and tactics. He went so far as to issue a fatwa (religious decree) ruling it as a violation of Islamic law. Azzam was against the killing of non-combatants and would never endorse the current terrorist tactics.

The same, however, cannot be said of Dr Ayman al Zawahiri. He is the person largely responsible for the al Qaeda’s mutation into what it is today. He not only filled the vacuum left by Azzam but transformed Bin Laden from a guerrilla who killed soldiers to a terrorist who killed civilians. Before al Zawahiri joined al Qaeda, he was already a practising terrorist, the mastermind of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the most deadly organizations in the Middle East. al Zawahiri’s experience against oppressive and repressive political regimes in Egypt made him “battle hardened”, compelled to continue the struggle against the present day *jahilia* at all cost.¹²

With the mobility of al Qaeda leaders confined to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Abu Musab al Zarkawi in Iraq has emerged as al Qaeda’s de-facto operational commander. Zarkawi seeks to wage a global jihad but disagrees both with Bin Laden and Zawahiri on the issue of the Shias. While al Qaeda core would like Zarkawi to target the new Iraqi government and the coalition forces, Zarkawi also targets the Shias. Nonetheless, both Zarkawi’s and his mentor’s – Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi - commitment to global jihad is unequivocal.

Al Qaeda's Worldview

Al Qaeda's worldview has changed over time. It perceives the US and Israel leading a global conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims, and perceives American hegemony as affecting the Muslim nation. Al Qaeda detests America's presence in the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Saudi Arabia; US support for the Israel state; US assistance to pro-Western dictatorships around the Middle East, and since the first Intifada in 1987 Bin Laden highlighted the neglected future of the Palestinians. Al Qaeda blames the US for everything and holds the US government, American people, and US foreign policy responsible for bringing chaos to the Muslim world. The only way the Muslim nation could live under the shade of Islam, al Qaeda ideologues argue, is to be united and work towards the establishment, by force if necessary, of an Islamic nation adhering to the rule of the Caliphs. It is with this in mind that Bin Laden issued the 1988 fatwa. Al Qaeda targets both non Muslims and Muslims that do not share al Qaeda's worldview. To Bin Laden and al Qaeda, it is a religious duty of Muslims around the world to wage jihad on the American land, American citizens, Israel and Jews. After 9/11, the targets include US allies, primarily Europe, Canada and Australia and friends, primarily Muslim countries that support the West. Those Muslims who do not heed this call are declared apostates, people who have forsaken their faith.

Al Qaeda's main aim is to establish Islamic states wherever Muslims live. The methodology for achieving this is jihad. Al Qaeda's ideology, often referred to as "jihadism", is marked by a willingness to carry out armed struggle against those who in their view try to prevent the establishment of an Islamic state. "Jihadism" is at odds with nearly all Islamic religious thought. "Jihadism" as practised by al Qaeda has its origins in the Middle East. As a concept, it is often associated with the work of two modern Sunni Islamic thinkers: Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab and Syed Qutb. Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahhab¹³ was an 18th century reformer. He claimed that Islam had been corrupted a generation or so after the death of the Prophet Mohammad. He denounced any theology or customs developed after that as non-Islamic, and in doing so tried to reform more than 1,000 years of religious scholarship. He and his supporters took over what is now Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism remains the dominant school of religious thought. Syed Qutb is an Egyptian scholar of the mid 20th century. He declared Western civilization an enemy of Islam and denounced leaders of Muslim nations for not following Islam closely enough. He preached that jihad should be undertaken not just to defend Islam, but to purify Islam. Other contemporary ideologues – Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi, Abu Qatada al Filastini and Abu Hamza al Masri – contributed significantly to al Qaeda's worldview.

As an extension of these ideologies, al Qaeda often couches its grievances in "Third Worldist" terms familiar to any contemporary anti-globalization activist, often framing modern political concerns, including social justice, within a divine and religious narrative. Jihad in the form of armed struggle in the name of God then becomes the means to attain freedom and rid the ummah of injustice. It is a way to punish the cruel as they have inflicted cruelty upon the ummah.¹⁴ The jihad they wage is a "defensive jihad" in the face of perceived aggression by the enemies of Islam and the Muslims. The presence of US and other non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War was a turning point in the life of Bin Laden. Although the US troops established a presence at the invitation of the Saudi royal family, Bin Laden justified his fight by renewing his commitment to "defensive jihad". He publicly criticized the Saudi royal family and alleged that their invitation of foreign troops to the Arabian Peninsula constituted an affront to the sanctity of

the birthplace of Islam and a betrayal of the Global Islamic community.¹⁵ As the Saudi government rendered him stateless, Bin Laden advocated violence against it and the United States. As it was difficult to strike inside Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden's ire increasingly focused on the United States. Following a period of exile in Sudan and Afghanistan his radical views sharpened. Jihad to al Qaeda followers was deemed justifiable in order to defend the dignity and pride of the nation, a noble duty which had been neglected by the Muslim leaders. Al Qaeda's conviction to political ideology couched in religious terms is therefore not easily swayed by cheap promises and materialistic gains. So long as there is no sincere attempt to meet its demands, al Qaeda will have sufficient support for the continuity of the jihad.

In May 1996, after Bin Laden moved from Sudan to Afghanistan he became more violent. He issued a declaration of war against the United States in August 1996. By moving to Afghanistan, he became an internationally recognizable figure with the opportunity to openly present his views. As the leader of al Qaeda, he underlined its resentment towards the US, described as the "alliance of Jews, Christians, and their agents".¹⁶ Even though he did not possess Islamic religious credentials or authority, Bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998. He claimed that the United States had made "a clear declaration of war on God, His messenger, and Muslims"¹⁷ through its policies in the Islamic world. This is another example of al Qaeda's jihad ideology which set the organization in motion.

With jihad comes the belief in martyrdom. Al Qaeda's operatives firmly believe that Allah guides and rewards those who sacrifice themselves for a noble cause. They are ever willing to sacrifice themselves without hesitation. The notion of a noble and blessed death achieved through martyrdom has been firmly embedded in their collective psyche. They view their acts as a sacrifice which is needed in order to achieve the goal of establishing the religion of Allah on earth. Their struggle yields one of the two things: victory or martyrdom.

The *bai'ah* or the pledge of allegiance serves as an assurance that those affiliating themselves to the organization are committed to the organization's ideology. By instituting it, the organization is freed from conceptual problems arising from differences in opinion. To a certain degree, through it an acceptable level of uniformity is maintained which contributed to the organization's stability and ease of management and administration.

They also have the notion that "true Islam or pure Islam" can only be established if the essence of Islamic society and its fundamentals are instituted. This requires the setting up of an Islamic state. Of course to achieve this end, the present Muslim society needs an Islamic movement which will provide leadership and the spiritual guidance.¹⁸ The Islamic movement is needed to keep in check the threat posed by a global conspiracy, trying to eradicate the Muslim identity by spreading godless and atheistic views among the Muslim masses. The arguments articulated in support of the ideology provide additional momentum for it to travel far and wide. As a result, a pan-Islamic ideology developed. In view of the prevalent animosity and prejudice against Islam, and the western hegemony, Islamic governments can never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. The battle concept was total war, "by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth".¹⁹ Re-creating the Caliphate thereby uniting the whole Muslim world into a single entity, is a logical conclusion drawn by al Qaeda to help bring the Muslim communities out of this dilemma.²⁰

The Impact of Ideology: the Driving Force

What actually motivates al Qaeda is not power, wealth or fame but an ideological belief in their struggles.²¹ The trap to be avoided by Western scholars is the common assumption that al Qaeda and other jihad groups are driven by publicity in pursuit of their broader goal.²² These groups fight existing governments they perceive as hostile to Islam and governments that have departed from the course of God and refused to apply the Shari'ah. They feel that their mission is legitimate and embark on actions which reflect the bitter historical and practical experience of those involved in the struggle.

To build support for their fight against the West, al Qaeda presents a common grievance that Muslims are the ones on the receiving end and therefore actions against the Muslim's enemies are worthy. Drawing lessons from the worldwide Muslim response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda ideologues now seek to unite the Muslims in a jihad against the West. In the last century, the many *mujahidin* factions that existed allied together to face the Soviets, a common enemy. They put aside their differences. Muslims could, regardless of nationality, fight side by side and attain victory for all. The individuals that filled the ranks of the *mujahidin* during this war, who came from all strata of society proved that greater achievements could be attained through unity based on common objectives. Momentous events such as the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan, the collapse of communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War precipitated the creation of over one hundred contemporary Islamist movements in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, the Balkans.

Although demonized in the Western media, Bin Laden is seen by his followers and those who fought with him in the Afghan war thus:

*"He not only gave us his money, but he also gave himself. He came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants and the Arab fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug trenches with them. This is Bin Ladin's way. His credentials include fighting in the famous battles of the whole Afghan war. In these battles the mujahidin came out victorious convincing them how the Soviet's huge military machine could be defeated by unconventional methods."*²³

The victory is often interpreted by al Qaeda ideologues as the will of men being singlehandedly defeated by the will of God. The internalization of the victory brought about a feeling of power derived from the belief that their effort had received divine legitimacy and a clear indication that the path they had taken was guided. Bin Laden's followers believe that it was the action of the *mujahidin* primarily supported by the Muslim world that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War. They also believe that the US had achieved its goal of becoming the sole global superpower through what Bin Laden and his fellow *mujahidin* had achieved in Afghanistan. Bin Laden later justified his actions by stating that MAK and its Islamist allies were being persecuted by "an ungrateful US" which had also taken credit for the defeat of the Soviets.²⁴

The presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s at the height of the Gulf War and likewise the US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were perceived by al Qaeda as acts of aggression.²⁵ Such perceptions generated widespread support and propelled al Qaeda forward, and helped it transform into its present

state. The US-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan has been instrumental in decentralizing al Qaeda's members but also dispersed them across the globe. Fragmentation and difficulty in communication with the central command forced them to reorganize into smaller, manageable and fluid groups which focused on attack against American interests worldwide as a form of retaliation. The US invasion and occupation of Iraq has widened the theatre of conflict. Today, there is unprecedented support for jihad groups, including al Qaeda. The deteriorating situation in Iraq is producing greater unity among disparate groups and galvanizing greater support for extremism and terrorism.²⁶ Today, al Qaeda working with Abu Musab al Zarkawi's Tawhid Wal Jihad has urged its followers to target both the domestic governments and Western interests.

Strategies and Tactics

Al Qaeda's ideology seeks to move, incite and mobilize the Muslim nation until it reaches a revolutionary ignition point. Although even 9/11 failed so far to effectively mobilize Muslim support, there exists a significant dissatisfaction with the United States and its foreign policy amongst the many Muslim societies in the Middle East and Islamic world. The trend is rising and will be used to further the cause. Al Qaeda's ideology has created a network of autonomous cells. To circumvent the governments' technical means of intelligence-gathering, they cleverly reverted to one-to-one contact, primarily via couriers. This explains why al Qaeda's German, British, Spanish, Dutch and Belgian cells acting in concert was discovered only during post facto investigations into the background of Muhammad Atta and the other 9/11 conspirators. Even after 7/7, it is very likely that there are other unknown cells in the UK functioning independently.

Al Qaeda has a unique structure combining highly centralized ideological indoctrination and coordination on one hand, but highly decentralized and self-sustaining practical activity on the other. In al Qaeda structure, Bin Laden is the Emir, essentially the military commander, whereas al Zawahiri is the strategic thinker, the ideologue.²⁷ Even so, they still allow the peripheral organizations plenty of flexibility. The militants felt that striking at the Arab regimes' Western sponsors (the "far enemy" as opposed to the "near enemy") would be the best means to improve local conditions. This strategy, which bin Laden and those around him aggressively advocate, remains contentious among Islamic radicals, especially in Egypt.²⁸

They differ significantly from more traditional terrorist organizations in that they do not depend on state sponsors. In addition to mounting its own operations, al Qaeda operates as a franchise by providing financial and logistical support, as well as name recognition, to terrorist groups operating in such diverse places as the Philippines, Algeria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen, Kashmir and Iraq. Local groups may act in the name of al-Qaeda in order to bolster their own reputation – even if they are not receiving support from the organization. Cooperation amongst groups has been known to exist. In addition to JI, MILF, Abu Sayyaff Group for instance often acted as a local liaison providing safe houses for visiting al Qaeda operatives.²⁹ The al Tawhid wal Jihad in Iraq group is another example.

Today, the al Qaeda infrastructure has been destroyed. Nonetheless, the group is capable of conducting attacks as lethal as 9/11. Although Bin Laden and his associates are scattered or have been arrested and killed in great number, the

organization has survived and the ideology is intact.³⁰ Although Afghanistan is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy, al Qaeda's worldview that "it is the duty of every good Muslim to wage jihad" is keeping the struggle alive. Al Qaeda's concept of global jihad to gain support from politicized and radicalized Muslims has worked to an extent sufficient to sustain a terrorist campaign. This radical internationalist ideology – sustained by anti-Western, anti-Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric – has adherents among many individuals and groups, few of whom are currently linked in any substantial way to bin Laden or those around him. They merely follow his precepts, models and methods. They act in style of al Qaeda, but they are only part of al Qaeda in the very loosest sense. With the diffusion of al Qaeda ideology, especially after 9/11, the threat has moved beyond the group and the individual. Israeli intelligence services now prefer the term "jihadi international" instead of "al Qaeda"³¹ and the British Special Branch refer to al Qaeda and its associated groups as "international terrorism".³² Although al Qaeda and its associated groups have been destroyed in Europe and North America, an al Qaeda movement of networked individuals has survived. These individuals, when mobilized by committed and experienced individuals, ensure periodic attacks.

Al Qaeda's current disposition

After it had played such a vital role in the defeat of communism, Afghanistan was neglected by the international community. Afghanistan became the crucible where contemporary jihad groups were spawned and shaped. After the Afghan-Soviet war, the mujahidin who returned to their homelands joined opposition political parties, religious bodies and other groups. They campaigned against dictatorial Muslim rulers and corrupt regimes. They wanted to replicate their success by creating Islamic states. Their very presence to a certain extent served as a catalyst for religious debate, social instability and political unrest. While non-violent campaign turned violent, violent campaign escalated. As a result many governments imprisoned the Afghan veterans, and others were denied entry, expelled and made stateless.³³ The US invasion of Iraq, the US overreaction to 9/11, has created a new land of jihad, increasing the threat severalfold. Although there are under 100 al Qaeda leaders and members in Iraq and under 1,000 Afghan trained terrorists in Iraq, the very act of invading a Muslim land has produced and continues to produce terrorists and extremists. It is vital that the counter terrorism community understand this.

More than the group, al Qaeda's ideology poses an unprecedented threat. The global challenge is to challenge the ideology. Western strategy comes in the form of targeting its leadership, crippling its command and control, and disrupting its current and future support bases. Four years after 9/11, the West has had very limited success. Al Qaeda remains a capable organization, infrequently packing surprises. It must be tackled in an unconventional way – a blend of hard and soft power. Only by using military force with ideological appeal can a wedge be driven between the terrorists and the potential followers. It is central that the counter terrorism community understand that without marrying hard power with soft power, the al Qaeda led Jihad movement cannot be defeated.

Especially after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, America's war against terrorism is perceived by Muslims all over the world as unprecedented assault on Islam. They feel besieged by America. The American response is primarily military. It failed to bring the historical, ideological and social dimensions into its calculations. No doubt America has the material resources to extend its influence

everywhere but it lacks the ideological and moral fibre to sustain this kind of domination. Here one could see the scenario whereby material power is confronting spiritual and ideological power. Therefore, it is not surprising that al Qaeda almost always challenges Western secularism and capitalism represented by America with Islam's basic body of literature, the Quran and the Sunnah. For Muslims worldwide, these are both extremely rich and powerful. In the ongoing battle against Islamist terrorism there is a pressing need to appreciate the full strategic significance of Islamic world view and spirituality.

In a campaign against global jihad, the US-led Western governments should think strategically. Most jihad organizations have meagre resources and often it is the over-reaction of states that has empowered them to evolved into formidable foes. The invasion of Iraq, though entirely justifiable from a humanitarian perspective, has made this task more difficult. Several new groups have spawned and existing groups have strengthened themselves. The mistakes in Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay must not be repeated.³⁴ The unintended consequences of US actions have increased the ideological power of the violent Islamists. If countries are to win the war on terror, the US-led coalition must eradicate existing enemies without creating new adversaries. Many experiences in counterinsurgency warfare attest that it makes good sense to target the enemy and to win over the general population. Whilst counter terrorist and counter insurgency campaigns must be conducted with the end objective of victory, retaining public support at all times is central.

It helps to remember that the protagonist, Bin Laden, who conducted the 9/11 operation is still alive and is directing his efforts at attracting those Muslims who have hitherto shunned his extremist message. As a master propagandist, he attempts to take the moral high ground. He knows that only through mass participation will he reap the fruit of success. Mistakes made in the "war on terror" could very well contribute to his worldview receiving immeasurably more support around the globe than it did three years ago, let alone 15 years ago when he began serious campaigning. The objective is to eliminate the threat of terror, or at least to manage it in a way that does not seriously impinge on the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Bin Laden's aim is to radicalize and mobilize. If those directly responsible for conducting the campaign are hasty in their decisions, actions and reactions, Bin Laden will continue to achieve his goals of further politicizing and radicalizing the Muslims, jihad ideologues and Bin Laden believe that time is in their favour. Although the threat has moved beyond bin Laden, the fact that Bin Laden is still alive and pontificating is a reminder that the Western strategy to fight al Qaeda is flawed.

The success of the war on Islamist terrorism depends heavily on how the threat is perceived and the campaign is managed at the policy, strategic, operational and tactical levels. As a start, the West in general and the US specifically must reflect upon their current and past policies towards the Muslim world, in particular the Middle East. More equitable policies and treatment will preserve our collective wellbeing and interests instead of pursuing selfish gains at the expense of others. In effect, the US should seek to change the reality in the Middle East and beyond. It is the only country that has the military, diplomatic, political, and economic power to do so.

Mainstream Muslims should be encouraged to fight the Muslim leaders who use and misuse religion for their political ends. Islam is a way of life and from the perspective of the Muslims the teaching of the Quran and the Sunnah is adhered to

in order to achieve the good life in this world and happiness in the life to come. In short, the Quranic thesis is that all life, being God-given, is a unity, and that problem of the flesh and of the mind, of sex and economics, of individual righteousness and social equity are intimately connected with the hopes which man may legitimately entertain with regard to his life after death. If this could be understood and accepted, then the dominating effect of Islamist terrorism which is condemned by Islam itself could be prevented from interfering with the discussion on Islam, and therefore allow a meaningful dialogue to be developed.

Once this is achieved grievances could be more effectively addressed, thus eliminating the possibilities of their being manipulated and catapulted into terrorism. The Islamic world must be allowed to decide whether or not to emulate the more successful Western secular models but never lock, stock and barrel; rather in a conscious manner, making adjustments where necessary in an attempt to apply them to local conditions. Mutual respect must always be there and a gradual change must be insisted upon. Learning to respect and safeguard each other's dignity applies in this case. Outward differentiation in the form of moral preferences must not diminish the global mutual desire to create a better world for all. Without a better understanding of the threat, the West cannot effectively sustain the campaign against the multiple jihad and Islamist movements.

Part III: Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah

Of the contemporary terrorist groups, one of the groups closest to al Qaeda is JI, southeast Asia's most active terrorist group. JI ideology evolved through three phases. In the first phase, the local jihad phase, Darul Islam (DI), the predecessor of JI, campaigned for an Islamic state in Indonesia. During this phase, DI attacked several Indonesian targets. In the second phase, the regional jihad phase, JI campaigned for an Islamic caliphate in southeast Asia. During this phase, JI conducted several attacks in the region. In the third phase, the global jihad phase, JI campaigned for global jihad. During this phase, JI directly targeted or assisted al Qaeda to target the US, its allies and its friends. JI ideology was driven and shaped by political space and operational opportunities.

This paper reviews Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah' [The General Guide for Islamic Group] commonly known as the PUPJI.³⁵ The founding charter of JI, PUPJI contains the core of JI's ideology. Furthermore, the thoughts of some of the prominent leaders of JI, debriefing of JI members, JI-al Qaeda relationship, and JI operations are considered.

Context

Like many jihad groups active on the international arena, JI began as a local jihad group and evolved into a global jihad group. After the leadership was forced to relocate from Indonesia to Malaysia, it came into contact with other foreign jihad groups. To advance its own agenda and that of the region, JI transformed itself into a Southeast Asian jihad group. After participating in the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, JI came into contact with al Qaeda, and thus shared its vision of global jihad. JI today is driven more by its newly acquired mission of a global jihad rather than its original mission to create an Islamic state in Indonesia or an Islamic caliphate in southeast Asia.

After September 11, JI is credited as conducting the second worst terrorist attack. Emulating Al Qaeda, JI conducted a coordinated simultaneous suicide bombing in the tourist resort of Bali killing 202 persons on October 12, 2002. The bombings of Sari Club and Paddy's café in Bali were followed by several other attacks including the suicide bombing of the Marriot hotel and the Australian Embassy, both in Jakarta, Indonesia. As the JI training camp Jabal Kuba in Mount Kararo in Mindanao, Philippines is still active, JI still retains significant capabilities to conduct terrorist attacks in the region.

Background

Since its detection in Singapore in December 2001, JI has suffered significant losses throughout southeast Asia. Nonetheless, the JI terrorist network is still active and poses a significant threat both regionally and internationally. Due to its training, financial and operational links to Al-Qaeda, JI developed as one of the most dangerous groups in the al Qaeda family. The historical roots of JI can be traced back to the rebellion led by Darul Islam (founded in 1949) in Indonesia which fought for an Islamic state in the 1950s. Over time, DI splintered and JI emerged as its most violent faction. Although individual DI members are co-opted by JI, DI as a group has abandoned violence. For instance, DI leader of West Java Rois recruited DI member Heri Golun who became the suicide bomber of the Australian High Commission in Jakarta in 2004.

JI's origins can be traced back to the DI movement in the early years of the Republic of Indonesia. DI opposed the secular nature of Sukarno's regime. To establish an Islamic state of Indonesia, DI fought the Sukarno regime from 1948 to 1962. Motivated primarily by politics, the DI rebellion in West Java was led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo. Before the Second World War, Kartosuwirjo was active in Muslim nationalist politics in the then Dutch East Indies. He felt unhappy with the pre-independence political manoeuvring of Masyumi's components, and in 1947 began gathering his militia members together in West Java.

In 1948, Kartosuwirjo announced the establishment of the Islamic Army of Indonesia (Tentera Islam Indonesia: TII) and proceeded to fight the newly formed Indonesian republic. For the next thirteen years he continued his struggle to establish an Islamic state. When Kartosuwirjo was arrested in 1962, the rebellion was finally crushed. During Suharto's years in power, beginning in 1966, Gen. Ali Moertopo reactivated DI to protect Indonesia against the danger of communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo.

In order to discredit activities by the Islamists which could affect the elections in 1977, some 185 people believed to be members of Komando Jihad, a group sharing Kartosuwirjo's ideals were arrested by the government by mid 1977. The founders of JI, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were amongst them. Both were deeply involved in dakwah (proselytisation) activities. Although they were never a part of the original DI, they fully endorsed its aims. Due to their meetings with Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran in short) who was accused of leading the Komando Jihad, both of them were charged with having been inducted into DI by Hispran. It is no secret that both of them were known for making statements urging disobedience to secular authority and not to acknowledge the validity of the Indonesian constitution. Sungkar and Ba'asyir rejected Pancasila as the state ideology and dared to criticize Suharto's government. Sungkar and Ba'asyir were tried in 1982

and sentenced to nine years in prison for subversion. Subsequently their sentences were reduced on appeal to three years and ten months. Facing imminent re-arrest, they fled to Malaysia. Sungkar was then-Indonesian president Suharto's number one enemy.

Formation of JI

In Malaysia, Sungkar also identified a number of sympathetic businessmen willing to take on Indonesian workers and supporting the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. In an effort to seek additional funding for their cause, Sungkar and Ba'asyir went to Saudi Arabia. Contacts were also established with the mujahidin in Afghanistan. This opened the gateway for JI members to be politicized and radicalized – JI members were trained militarily and exposed to armed jihad.

In Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'asyir managed to gain support from Malaysians for their cause. This gave them the strength to form their own organization. After a dispute with the Indonesian-based DI leader named Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar formed JI in 1993. Sungkar's new group did not initially have a name but by 1995 Sungkar's followers were formed into small groups consisting of 8 to 10 members who would hold weekly meetings, and they were known as al Jemaah al Islamiyah.³⁶ Members of his first small cell included Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, Abdul Ghani, Jamsari, Suhauime, Matsah, Adnan and Faiz Bafana.³⁷ The weekly meetings of JI included koranic studies as well as activities to prepare members for jihad. JI was a more tightly structured organization than DI, but still having the same aim to set up an Islamic state in Indonesia. Although JI ideology evolved, like DI JI believed that through jihad an Islamic state could be established in Indonesia. Only later did their ambition grow into creating a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.

JI's world-view expressed in the PUPJI

In the introduction of the PUPJI, the Central Leadership Council of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah wrote that God has outlined a number of set principles for mankind to lead their lives. Firstly, the aim of man's creation is to worship Allah alone.³⁸ Consequently all worldly possessions, time, energy and thought must be channeled towards this end.

Secondly, human existence on earth is to serve as God's vice-gerent.³⁹ In this respect, man is responsible for ensuring that the earth is managed and developed within the confine of God's laws. He thus is required to prevent, eliminate and fight all acts of corruption on earth as a result of the implementation of a way of life which falls outside the domain of God's law.

Thirdly, life on earth is a test to filter and sieve members of the human race in order to determine who has performed the best deed. Good deeds are judged based on the fulfilment of two fundamental requirements, namely sincerity towards God and emulating the Prophet in life's endeavour.

Fourthly, the apostles of God were sent by Him to establish the *dien*. The meaning of 'establishing the *dien*' or '*Iqomatid Dien*' according to the exegetes (*Mufasssirun*) is to established a way of life based on the unity of God (*Tauhid*) which relates to establishing Islam in all its aspects, as explained by the companion of the Prophet

Muhammad, ^cAbdullah bin ^cUmar in his commentary of the *Surah Al-Fatehah*, which according to him include ^c*aqidah* (Islamic creed), ^c*ibadah* (act of worship) and *manhajul-hayah* (way of life).

The Prophet Muhammad in discharging his duties as the messenger of God has successfully integrated both the physical and spiritual aspects of life in total submission to the worship of God. His examples were then emulated by the Rightly-guided Caliphs, the other companions of the Prophet and later generations with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless the Muslim ummah still manage to retain a separate polity, coloured by their strong conviction towards Islam.

The fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 marks the beginning of an era where the Muslim community is exposed to moral decadence caused by modernity and a secular system. In order to correct this, JI, claiming to be one of the Islamic revival movements having the above world-view, strove to re-establish the Islamic caliphate as a solution.⁴⁰

What is JI's Ideology and why?

In general, JI ideology refers to the comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which JI makes sense of the world. It is an attempt by them to provide some explanation of how things have come to be as they are and some indication of where they are heading as a basis to guide their action. It also provides criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood and valid arguments from invalid according to their perspective, and some overriding belief in what they are doing to which they may make a final appeal when challenged by outsiders. Although JI ideology relies on the Quran, the Sunnah and the interpretation of the venerable forefathers (*Salafush-Sholih*), it must be stressed that it is by no means a definitive interpretation of Islam and representative of the views held by the Muslim scholars.⁴¹ This implies that it has its limits, that it is just one set of interpretation among others, and that it can be quite distinct from the truth and inconsistent with the general principles of Islam which allow an independent judgment to be made with full cognizance of the changing political, social and economic landscapes.⁴²

In their understanding of Islam as a universal religion, JI preaches the need to practise Islam in its totality which is referred to as *Islam Kaffah*.⁴³ Within this framework they hope to achieve peace in the worship of God in the widest sense of the word by accepting the Quranic guidance not only towards the spiritual good of the hereafter but also towards the good life – spiritual, physical and social – attainable in this world.

In giving their struggle further credibility, the concept of '*Al Wala' Wal Bara*'⁴⁴ which specifies whom they consider their friends and enemies, are knitted into the fabrics of the Islamic creed (*Aqidah*), providing religious justification and legitimacy for their actions. In logical pursuance of this line of thinking they felt the obligation to rid the world of polytheism, falsehood and oppression so that mankind is guided to the highest level of morality and civilization by the establishment of the Islamic state.

The present state of the Muslim ummah, without the potent central leadership in religion, politics and military once enjoyed during the time of the prophet and the Rightly-guided Caliphs, warrants the setting up of the *daulah Islamiah* as an

ideological state based on the holistic Islamic teachings. Its establishment would then ensure unity between religion and state, correcting the polarity caused by the dichotomy between the profane and the sacred caused by secular ideologies.

In pursuing this aim, JI stressed the need for individual Muslim to be in a group (*Al-Jamaah*). This according to them is a necessary precursor to the establishment of an Islamic state. Under this ideology, the individual Muslim is required to pledge allegiance (*Al-Bai'ah*) in order to be officially a member of JI. With this pledge, JI members become obligated to listen (*Al-Sam'cu*) and obey (*Al-Ta'ah*) to the best of their ability in matters which do not constitute a sin to God, to the Amir as the leader of the group and other appointed leaders (*Mas'cul*). When these conditions are not satisfied, the person concerned is disqualified from being a member and is seen as having committed a sin by dishonouring his *ba'iah*.⁴⁵

In providing JI's members with the milestones towards the direction of establishing the Islamic state, *Iman* (belief), *Hijrah* (emigration in the way of God), *I'dad* (preparation for the struggle in the way of God) and *Jihad* (struggle in the way of God), the stages the Prophet Muhammad were reported to have gone through in calling people to the fold of Islam were presented as the path along which JI treads. Alternatively, this path which is also described as the method employed in JI's struggle is also known as the path of *dakwah* (inviting or calling people to worship God by following the Messenger of God), *tarbiyah* (education), *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil) and *jihad*.⁴⁶

In essence, JI is a group which is a staunch supporter of Islamic rule and jihad. They constantly urged Muslims to go to war against the enemies of Islam who resisted the application of Islamic law, by appealing to the doctrine of jihad, emphasizing the meaning of armed struggle. Initially, the need to resist the threat represented by secular, anti-Islamic regimes was aimed at the Indonesian government but in its later development included Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. A key figure in promoting this ideology, Abu Jibril, alias Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman, in his lectures went so far as to call for the setting up of a "Nusantara Islamic State" (*Daulah Islamiah Nusantara*), together with preaching *jihad* and the desirability of dying as martyr.⁴⁷

What motivated them?

Drawing conclusion from JI's ideology, their motivation could be classified into three main categories: religious, political and socio-economic. On closer examination, religion appears to be the main component which provides the much needed common platform in gelling Muslims of different nationalities and social background together for a common cause. More often than not, religious texts are quoted to explain, educate and motivate JI's members into commitment. Fear in divine retribution and hopeful for the rewards in the hereafter are instituted via lectures given by charismatic lecturers, causing JI's members to view JI's struggle as being synonymous to Islam's.⁴⁸

The strong religious overtones in JI's ideology therefore eclipse all other types of motivation, be it political or socio-economic. The end result is a group driven by the belief that their actions are validated and legitimized by Islam, hence the need to support it with undivided loyalty. This was evident in Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's address during the Mujahidin II Congress, held in Surakarta, Jawa Tengah on 10 – 12 August 2003. In mentioning historical facts of the Indonesians' struggle for

independence from the Dutch, he highlighted that the underlying intention of their struggle is to practise the Sharia so that the obligation to worship God is fully realized. He reasoned that the freedom to practise the Sharia in its totality was inhibited during the Dutch, English and Japanese rule.⁴⁹ The same line of reasoning could also be traced to Egypt's *Gamaa Islamia* who ruled that it is a religious obligation to fight against political regimes that refuse to implement the Sharia.⁵⁰ The vision of Syed Qutb in this respect is no different.⁵¹ Having different parties speaking about the same thing, all quoting from Islam's rich sources certainly gave JI the extra religious mileage and superficial correctness to fuel their struggle.

The '*Ushulul Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqamatid Dien*'⁵² which are the methodological principles to establish the *Al-Dien* which formed the primary foundation of JI's ideology, was evidently drawn and crystallized from religious sources. The extensive use of the Arabic words with religious connotations even when the PUPJI is written in the Indonesian language leaves little room for doubt of the presence of religious motivation at its core. Therefore, the arguments presented in support of JI's ideology and actions naturally follow the same path.

According to the White Paper, the psychologist concluded that many JI members turned to leaders like Ibrahim Maidin as they wanted a "no fuss" path to heaven. They wanted to be convinced that in JI they had found "true Islam" and freed themselves from endless searching as they found it stressful to be critical, evaluative and rational. They believed they could not go wrong, as JI's leaders had quoted from holy texts. The psychological profile of the JI's members (e.g. high compliance, low assertiveness, low in the questioning of religious values, and high level of guilt and loneliness) suggested that the group of JI's members was psychologically predisposed to indoctrination and control by JI's leaders and needed a sense of belonging without close attachments. Some were altruistic and wanted to help the ummah. Others wanted to accumulate "points" for a place in heaven.⁵³

Seeking God's pleasure and the promise of martyrdom if they died in the cause of *jihad* in trying to establish the Islamic state with which JI's members believe a better life in the hereafter is secured are some of the reasons powerful enough to motivate them. These are the contents of the lectures Mohammad Iqbal Bin Abdul Rahman, alias Abu Jibril an Indonesian who is a permanent resident of Malaysia, gave to the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) which according to the allegations against him could encourage them to overthrow the legitimate Malaysian government through armed struggle.⁵⁴

Politically and from the socio-economic perspective, JI's members owe their motivation to the fact that the establishment of the Islamic state is seen as a promise to a better government and system which are harmonious with the tenets of Islam. Under Islam-friendly condition, justice and equality will prevail and an environment conducive towards the total submission to God in all of life's endeavours will be created. The experience of JI's leaders like Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir during Suharto's time bears testimony to this. They were arrested, tried and sentenced to jail for subversion. The policy of *azas tunggal* or "sole basis" Suharto's government implemented was viewed as a violation of Islamic law, hence the need for a group, "Jemaah Islamiah" committed to the strict implementation of Islamic law, to correct the government's wrongdoing.

The *jihad* against the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 – 1989) was interpreted as a positive development of *jihad* that provided inspiration, experience, network and global mobility as well as increasing the military capability of the many groups that had participated in the war. JI is no exception to this, as the members of the group including senior members holding leadership appointments were trained and involved in this war.⁵⁵

The strategies they adopted

To ensure its survivability various strategies were adopted by JI to deal with every possible situation they might encounter at every stage of their struggle. Their formulation helps to increase the chances of achieving what they set out to do and for this purpose the PUPJI clearly spelt out in the *Al-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien* (The Progressive Methodology In Establishing The Religion) and *Al-Manhaj Al-Amaliy Li Iqomatid Dien* (The General Operational Guide In Establishing The Religion) the broad guidelines for JI's members to follow.

Al-Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien reveals that JI have divided their struggle into three stages, namely preparation to establish the *Daulah* (Islamic State), the setting up of the *Daulah* itself and from there the establishment of the caliphate.

During the first stage, the formation of the *jamaah* (group) supersedes the formation of the group's various capabilities and its employment. The formation of the righteous leadership who supposedly are the core people is an integral part of this formation. They not only lay the groundwork but also construct and design the group. In ensuring that the group can continue their metamorphosis undisturbed, JI adopts secrecy in whatever they do. These include operating on a need-to-know basis. The investigation by Singapore's Internal Security Department (ISD) of the JI members detained uncovered that they operate as a clandestine organization, complete with code names and "JI-speak"⁵⁶. To prove the point, most of the 2000 arrests to date have been foot soldiers with no knowledge of operations or the organization.⁵⁷

Discipline and obedience amongst the members is ensured under the scope of developing the faith. Listening and obeying the leadership is also inculcated through *Amar ma'ruf, nahi munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil) and *hisbah*, which serve as thermostats in controlling fluctuations in the members' commitment. Members are obligated to collectively ensure compliance and refrain from deviation from directives issued by the leadership.

With these firmly in place, JI began developing their strength in education which confers the ability to systematically instill, expand and change the world-view, emotion, desire and practice of those following their programmes towards becoming more Islamic, which in JI sense means *jihad* to set up an Islamic State⁵⁸. *Dakwah* or missionary work is an attempt by JI to reach out to the masses, to communicate their ideology and popularize *Islam Kaffah* that exposes the Muslim community's shortcomings, both in terms of understanding and practice of 'true Islam'. The feeling of guilt from exposure is capitalized, to bring about further understanding of JI's explanation on Islam and in the process providing a platform for getting new members or at least their alignment with JI's cause, thus neutralizing animosity.

Tansiq bainal jama'at is another strategy whereby JI collaborate with other Islamic groups that share their world-view. Various studies on JI have shown that JI is

willing to forge alliances domestically, regionally and globally to remain potent and able, in order to achieve their aim. The link with Al-Qaeda, MILF and KMM are possible manifestations of it. Even the formation of Rabitatul Mujahidin could be interpreted in this light.

Tamwil which is mentioned in the PUPJI without details, could be translated as financing JI's activities. It is done by collecting *infaq*, a monthly contribution compulsory upon JI's members who are working. Additional funds are derived mostly from foreign donations, and some may have come from al Qaeda for specific operations, according to the ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002.

Jihad Musallah, if translated as armed struggle, is the most dangerous strategy employed by JI. It indicates JI's willingness to develop military capabilities to wage war in order to establish the Islamic state. Some of JI's members were trained in Afghanistan and MILF military camps and after their graduation either planned or were involved in terrorist attacks. The disclosure no doubt provides clear indication of JI final transformation no matter how mild and harmless it seemed at the start.

JI-Al Qaeda Nexus:

Gradually, JI's involvement in Afghanistan grew. The shared experience in Afghanistan not only provided the members with military training but also strengthened the spirit of Islamic brotherhood. They came into contact with Maktab-il-Khadimat (MaK) led by Abdullah Azzam, and after his assassination, al Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden and other Afghan groups that received foreign mujahidin from all over the world that came in defence of Afghanistan. As a result their ideology became concretized, their motivation grew stronger and their strategies more refined. The mujahidin's victory in Afghanistan over the Russians without the slightest doubt gave them confidence and to a certain extent notion of similar victories in the future. Unlike the other southeast Asian Islamist groups, JI at this stage was an ideological hybrid. JI was influenced strongly by Egyptian Islamists known for their radicalism. JI developed strong orientation towards the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia. In particular, the ideology of *al Gamaa al Islamiyah al Masri* (The Islamic Group of Egypt) and to a lesser extent *al Islamiyah al Jihad al Masri* (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) influenced JI thinking and structure.⁵⁹ In the mid 1990s, at the time when JI ideology was taking shape, Dr Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad visited and spent time engaging the JI leadership in Malaysia. In the second half of the 1990s, Sungkar and Bashir visited Pakistan. Sungkar met Bin Laden on three occasions.

JI developed into one of the most dangerous terrorist groups after it gradually developed close operational ties with al Qaeda. The relationship was forged by Hambali, an Indonesian cleric, who as a child aspired to be an astronaut. During early 1980s, while living in Malaysia, Hambali became a follower of Sungkar. Through his contact with Sungkar, Hambali was invited in 1986 to go to Afghanistan for training and to support the mujahidin. While Hambali spent the next two months in Karachi awaiting further instructions, he met a number of individuals from Indonesia including Zulkarnaen who also became close to al Qaeda.⁶⁰ In early 1987, Hambali and his colleagues underwent two months of military training with Ak47s, MAC-1s, handguns, 60MM mortars and RPGs.⁶¹ After Hambali returned to Malaysia in mid-1988, he travelled to the Philippines (Tawitawi) as a missionary and lived with a local Muslim family in 1991. During this time, he met Samsuddin, an Indonesian who subsequently brought him to the

MILF Camp Abubakar. He also met the then MILF leader Salamat Hashim at the camp at that time. After 9 months in the Philippines, he returned to Malaysia via Sabah and proceeded to Selangor.

In 1994-1995, Hambali came into contact with Khalid Sheikh Mohommed, who subsequently masterminded the 9/11 attack, and other important al Qaeda members, including Wali Amin Khan Shah, who worked with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to destroy 12 US airliners over the Pacific. From 1995-1997, Hambali's involvement with al Qaeda deepened and he was subsequently asked to head Mantiqi I replacing Ba'asyir who then became the head of the Markaz. Markaz was the governing body that oversaw all JI organizations, which were made up of regional groups or mantiqis. There were originally only two Mantiqis – Mantiqi I which covered Malaysia and Singapore; and Mantiqi II which covered Indonesia, Sabah and the Philippines. Mantiqi III later covered Kalimantan, Mindanao and the southern Philippines and Sulawesi. There was a Mantiqi IV which covered Australia; however this Mantiqi consisted of only about 20 members, all of whom were Indonesian nationals residing in Australia.

In 1998, the Markaz consisted of Sungkar, Ba'asyir, Zulkarnaen, Rushdan and Mukhlas. Apart from serving as Markaziah Board members, these individuals also served in the JI Shura majelis (consultative council), which influenced the JI activities from a Koranic perspective. Mantiqi I was headed by Hambali, Indonesian national Fati headed Mantiqi II and Nasir Abas headed Mantiqi III. There were four Wakalabs or areas under the control of Mantiqi I - Perak, headed by Murad; Singapore, headed by Ma Selamat Kastari; Johor, headed by Wan Min Bin Wan Mat; and Kuala Lumpur and Selangor. In 1997-98, JI primarily focused its activities on funnelling money to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. This changed in 1998 when the Markaz decided to start sending members and military equipment to Southern Philippines. From Mantiqi I, groups of Malaysians were sent to MILF camps for training and to support their Muslim brothers. Indonesian JI operative al-Ghozi was the JI's primary contact in the Philippines and Zulkarnaen was responsible for sending groups of Malaysian and Singapore members to the Philippines. Almost all the leaders were Afghan trained – they were the key decision makers.

Post-Sungkar JI

After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Sungkar and Ba'asyir returned to Indonesia to continue their struggle. When Sungkar, the charismatic leader of JI, died in 1999, Ba'asyir succeeded him. This caused some unhappiness. The younger members of JI - Hambali, Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra, Ali Gufron alias Muchlas - saw Ba'asyir as too weak, too accommodating, and too easily influenced by others. Ba'asyir believed in the militant and the political track. Together with Irfan Awwas Suryahardi, Bashir founded the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in August 2000.⁶² This faction led by Suryahardi could be regarded as the political faction of JI. Suryahardi's brother Abu Jibril alias Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman was one of the key ideologues of JI and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Association of Militants of Malaysia: KMM) then living in Malaysia. MMI was an umbrella group of Islamist groups campaigning for the enforcement of Shariah. The JI hardliners led by Hambali saw the formation of MMI as a betrayal of Abdullah Sungkar's political analysis that JI should remain underground in their struggle to set up an Islamic state. The Hambali led group was of the opinion that accommodation with a non-Islamic political system could

contaminate the faithful and was forbidden. This faction could be regarded as the political faction of JI. Ba'asyir on the other hand saw it as an opportunity that must not be wasted. Ba'asyir, who had relocated to the village of Ngruki, where he headed the Pondok al Mukmeen, led a third faction in Solo, Central Java. The Ba'asyir faction can be regarded as the radical faction of JI.

Despite the differences, the three JI factions – political (Yogyakarta-centric), radical (Solo-centric), and terrorist (Malaysia-centric) - cooperated and at times collaborated with each other. They all shared the common belief that an Islamic state must be established in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia. They were divided on the methodology. The JI political faction believed in political struggle, JI radical believed in the political and the militant, and JI terrorist believed in the militant. The bulk of the JI terrorist faction were Afghan trained and were the closest to al Qaeda. As JI increasingly came under the influence of al Qaeda, JI tactics included terrorist means. Ba'asyir had no objection to the conduct of terrorist operations but also saw the merits of investing in the political struggle. While meeting prominent leaders of the Indonesian government including its then Vice President Hamzah Haz, Ba'asyir continued to admire Bin Laden and followed his ideals, repeated his rhetoric, and supported al Qaeda operations in Southeast Asia. Despite the differences in opinion JI functioned as a network of Islamic radicals extending across Southeast Asia, led by Indonesian nationals. For effective functioning, JI maintained a loose structure characterized by the four territorial divisions known as mantiqis.⁶³ Although these formal structures have been dissolved and mantiqi one dismantled, JI cells are still organized around the mantiqi structures.

In 2000, JI created Rabitat-ul-Mujahidin (Legion of Mujahidin), an umbrella of Southeast Asian Islamist and nationalist groups engaged in armed struggle. Its members included Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, Araken Rohingya Nationalist Organisation, Jemmah Salafiya (Thailand).

Like al Qaeda, the vanguard of the global Islamic movement, JI aspired to be the vanguard of the Southeast Asian groups. It wished to lead the way in the region. Most of the JI leaders who serve on the highest rung of the organizational ladder are protégés of Abdullah Sungkar. Many of them were alumni of the Pondok al Mukmeen in the village of Ngruki, one of the most famous pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) in Central Java. They are mostly Indonesian nationals living in Malaysia, and veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance or, more frequently, the post-Soviet period in Afghanistan. A trusted second tier, who share many of those characteristics, appear to be assigned as field coordinators, responsible for delivering money and explosives and for choosing a local subordinate who can effectively act as team leader of the foot soldiers. The bottom rung, the people who drive the cars, survey targets, deliver bombs, and most often risk arrest, physical injury, or death, are selected shortly before the attack is scheduled. They are mostly young men from pesantrens. The schools that provide the recruits are often led by religious teachers with ties to DI rebellions of the 1950's or to the Pondok al Mukmeen.

Al Qaeda Influence deepens

Prior to his death, Sungkar sent Hambali to Karachi to meet Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11. The purpose of the meeting was to deepen the already established ties and arrange for JI members to travel to Afghanistan to

receive training. Hambali made two trips to Pakistan in 1999 – the first trip alone and the second he was accompanied by JI senior operative Faiz Bafana. From 1998-2001, Hambali funnelled some US\$12,000 to the MILF and some US\$18,000 to Muslim fighters in Ambon, Indonesia. JI operated a Malaysian government sanctioned/registered NGO called Jamah al Ehsan, which raised money to be sent directly to Ambon. JI participated in the Christmas eve Church bombings in Indonesia in 2000, the MILF Manila train bombing in the same year and the attack against the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia. On the 2000 December Manila bombings, JI provided US\$4,000 to carry out the bombing of a train in Manila in 2000. Although coordinated by al Ghazi, the actual bombing was carried out by Philippine JI member Mucklis, who later participated in the Bali bombing. The attack against the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia was also a JI operation. Al Ghazi was primarily responsible for this operation and JI provided some US\$4,000 for it.

Because of ongoing investigations in Indonesia and Malaysia, Hambali and his wife left Malaysia and travelled to Afghanistan via Bangkok using his true name Malaysian passport and with \$5,000 cash. After arriving in Karachi, they proceeded to Kandahar where they stayed for one month. While in Afghanistan, Hambali's primary contacts included Mohommed Atef, alias Abu Hafis, the military commander of al Qaeda (killed in November 2001) and Khalid Sheikh Mohommed. Increasingly al Qaeda relied on JI, specifically Hambali, who held both al Qaeda and JI appointments.

At the request of al Qaeda, the JI network in Australia recruited and funded Jack Roche, an Australian Muslim convert to bomb Israeli and Jewish targets in Australia.⁶⁴ Similarly, to assist al Qaeda's anthrax program, Hambali recruited Yazid Sufaat, a US trained biochemist and a former Army Captain from Malaysia, who came to Afghanistan in June 2001. Yazid participated in a one-month training course and then began working with Hambali supporting the anthrax program in Kandahar. When the US-led bombing campaign started in Afghanistan in October 2001, Hambali briefly met Yazid in Karachi before his return to Malaysia and they discussed the continuing anthrax program in Indonesia. Yazid was arrested by the Malaysian Special Branch upon his return to visit his wife in Malaysia; Hambali who was living with his wife was arrested in Thailand by the Thai Special Branch. During this period, Hambali had provided al Qaeda funds to cells in Indonesia to bomb Bali and other targets.

With assistance, close interaction, dual membership, JI had almost become an appendage of al Qaeda. During a decade at least, a very important component of JI had come under the operational as well as the ideological control of al Qaeda. For instance, JI Chief Singapore Mas Selamat Kastari planned to hijack an Aeroflot plane from Bangkok and crash it on Changi International Airpor in Singapore, a clear al Qaeda tactic. He chose a Russian plane to express his anger at the Russian treatment of his Chechen brothers, a conflict steadfastly supported by al Qaeda. This is reflected in the attacks on Bali in 2002, Jakarta Marriot in 2003 and the Australian High Commission in 2004, all Western targets. After the arrest of Hambali, the terrorist faction of JI is led by Dr Azahari Hussein and Noordin Muhammed Top. They constantly refer to Iraq, including in the communiqué written by Noordin Muhammed Top immediately after the Australian High Commission bombing in 2004. Southeast Asians influenced by JI and al Qaeda will travel to Iraq to participate in the campaign against the US.⁶⁵ A significant proportion of JI members believe in al Qaeda ideology and continue to actively participate in al Qaeda's avowed mission of global jihad.

Part IV: Response

There must be greater international and domestic cooperation within and between government and agencies engaged in fighting terrorism and extremism.⁶⁶ Without targeting ideological extremism, terrorism will continue. The link between ideological extremism and terrorist action should be understood. It is a cycle. Extremism breeds violence. Without controlling extremism, the threat of terrorism cannot be managed. Extremism fuels terrorism, and in turn, terrorism fuels extremism. Each attack, successful or not, breeds support among the extremists for greater violence. To combat extremism, a robust ideological response must be developed.

Until now, the ideological or intellectual battle has been overlooked. There has been no effort to ideologically target al Qaeda and JI and other comparable groups that apply religious justification to legitimate and authenticate their terrorist activities. No effort must be spared in bridging the gaps arising from different world-views and their implementation. Programmes which explore and encourage efforts to diminish the sources of mistrust and misunderstanding that harm relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim must be carried out. This includes mobilizing moderate Muslims to empower those who advocate cooperation and non-violent solutions to conflict. The aim is to marginalize the militants and extremists who advocate intolerance.⁶⁷

The stress must always be on the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in the form of a conversation, not a monologue, where clear and truthful messages could be exchanged and examined with sincerity.

The renewed vigour shown by the Muslim community in seeking to deepen their understanding and practice of Islam must not be equated with extremism. It is an attempt to find answers in Islam on the many challenges they face in the rapidly changing world. The Muslims need to contemporarize their understanding of Islam, preserving the five essential values of religion, lives, intellect, progeny and property.

In order to have a united voice against terrorism the moderate Muslim majority must remain well organized and single minded on this issue. Divergent views on many religious issues must be prevented from blooming into terrorism when a consensus could not be reached. The challenge here is to build and maintain institutions of authority for Muslims to refer to for enlightenment. Likewise, for those who are already in possession of greater Islamic knowledge a platform for intellectual discourses must be prepared, to channel differing opinions constructively.

Educating the public on the ideologies, organizations and terrorist tactics without blaming Islam and the Muslims must be done both formally and informally, so that they are prepared to be a part of a collective force against terror. They are strategic partners in it and recognize that they have more to lose than gain if the political and economic stability is upset.

The Al Qaeda-JI Nexus

Had JI leadership remained in Indonesia, it might very well have remained a local jihad group. After the JI leadership moved to Malaysia, the support from Muslims

living in Southern Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines made the JI leadership expand their mission to include Muslim Southeast Asia and beyond. As a direct result of al Qaeda contact, JI members began to think and act like al Qaeda. JI fully shared al Qaeda's vision of a global jihad and heeded bin Laden's call to attacks Jewish and Crusader targets. JI hosted the al Qaeda members that planned the USS Cole attack and two 9/11 pilots, including its deputy operational commander Nawaf al Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.⁶⁸ Furthermore, JI hosted Zacariya Moussoui, an al Qaeda suicide pilot now in US custody. Both the pre-and post 9/11 JI target selection included US, British, Australian and Israeli targets. Thus even before 9/11, JI had adopted al Qaeda's model of global jihad. As in several other cases, al Qaeda's overarching dominant ideology was successful in "hijacking" JI's parochial ideology.

The JI ideology, although uses religion as its base, is not necessarily true to the principles and spirit of Islam. The complexity and interconnectedness of the modern world requires Islam to be accepted as having the potential to provide solutions to contemporary problems. Dialogues, research and cooperation in which Islam and Muslims are partners could contribute towards the creation of a better world. The ability to articulate different and at times conflicting views must be a basis in finding solution. Deliberations must be made without bias and placing public interest above self-importance or narrow national interests.

Managing the Threat

Terrorism is a vicious by-product of extremism. As such, it is essential to counter ideological extremism. The three approaches to combating this threat in the immediate (1-2 years), mid (5 years) and in the long term (10 years) are to invest in (1) operational counter terrorism, (2) strategic counter terrorism and (3) conflict resolution respectively.

Operational Counter Terrorism: During the first three years after 9/11, the US-led model for fighting terrorism has largely been the Rumsfeld approach, named after the determined US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Until now the US strategy is to target terrorist operational or execution cells as opposed to their ideological motivations and intentions. After 9/11, governments invested in developing their operational counter-terrorist capabilities, increased the budgets and expanded the numerical strength of their intelligence communities and enforcement authorities. As a result, governments were able to monitor a larger number of suspected terrorists, collaborators, supporters and sympathizers and conduct timely arrests. By targeting terrorist cells planning and preparing attacks, governments have reduced the imminent threat to the immediate. Post 9/11 investment in operational counter terrorism degraded terrorist capabilities in the US and elsewhere. Nonetheless, there was little or no investment strategic counter terrorism as opposed to operational. Strategic counter terrorism advocates government actions that seek to reduce the political and operational space for terrorism to spawn and sustain.

Strategic Counter Terrorism: The strands of strategic counter terrorism are in ideological, educational, media, legislative and financial responses.⁶⁹ The key is to counter the extremist ideology that triggers, drives and justifies terrorism. Like ideological response to terrorism, which exposes the deviant teachings of al Qaeda and its associated groups, initiatives in educational response seeks to make it difficult for terrorists and extremists to use the current Islamic school system to

politicize and radicalize Muslims. As one of the methods by which terrorist ideologues recruit members is to subvert the madrasahs, it is necessary to institute measures preventing the spread of extremism through these institutions. Similarly, it is essential to establish an ethic against terrorism and extremism in the wider society. To build communities that abhor violence, it is necessary for governments to work with the media to counter political extremism and violence. The media has played such an important role in formally and informally educating the public and raising their awareness about disease and famine. Similarly with the legislative response to terrorism.

Resolving Regional Conflicts: Likewise, there has been limited investment by western governments in understanding the value of resolving the regional conflict zones that spawn and sustain terrorism and virulent ideologies. To reduce the threat of political violence in the international system, it is essential for the international community to develop the capability to end regional conflicts through political negotiation. Regional conflict zones – Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao [Philippines], Maluku [Indonesia], Poso [Indonesia], Algeria, Afghanistan and Iraq – are the biggest producers of human rights violations, internal displacement, refugee flows and terrorists. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 1970s and 1980s produced terrorists and spilled over to neighbouring countries; Afghanistan produced the largest number of terrorists in the 1990s and today. International neglect of regional conflicts, thinking that the warring parties will fight each other and exhaust themselves, a prevalent notion in the West, proved wrong when al Qaeda organized a strike against post-modern US from pre-modern Afghanistan.

As most politically motivated groups adopted violence due to circumstances, if the right opportunities are created many terrorist groups will negotiate, join mainstream politics and end the violence. By developing capabilities to facilitate negotiation and by actively mediating between warring factions, the space for ideological extremism and political terrorism can be significantly reduced. However the relevant knowledge and tools for building peace processes must be developed and resources allocated.

Like economically motivated violence – crime - the citizens of the world are beginning to live with politically motivated violence - terrorism. Like other threats confronting humankind, by making certain investments, the threat of terrorism too can be managed. It is a resilient and a intractable threat. Therefore, it must be dealt with broadly and strategically. Three years after 9/11, the time is right for governments worldwide to assess the successes and failures in the fight against terrorism and extremism. Operational counter terrorism has been successful to the point of keeping the number of attacks to a manageable level, but insufficient to counter the strategic threat posed by the jihad movement. Without preventing the ideological politicization and radicalization of the Muslim communities in the migrant diaspora of the West and the territorial communities of the south, the threat will persist. Building the capabilities to fight the strategic campaign require greater political will and public understanding. Investment in building capabilities to end catalyst conflicts is central to reducing especially the long term threat.

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Endnotes

¹For their invaluable guidance, I wish to thank my colleagues Dr. Graeme P. Herd and Col. Nick Pratt,

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; and the George Marshall Centre, Garmish, Germany; Paul Smith, Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Hawaii, US; and Ustaz Mahfuh Halimi of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore.

² In the pre-9/11 environment many scholars attributed terrorism to poverty and lack of education. Osama Bin Laden, Emir-General, Al Qaeda comes from the richest non-royal Saudi family and Dr Ayman al Zawahiri from one of the most educated families in Egypt.

³ Three years after 9-11, as the US strategy on “war against terrorism” began to fault, the US government is now seeking craft its campaign as “a struggle against violent extremism.”

⁴ Osama bin Laden kept the name of Al Qaeda a public secret until the US attacked Afghanistan in October 2001. As such, he did not focus on building support for Al Qaeda, the single group, but for the wider jihad movement, throughout the 1990s and beyond.

⁵ Briefing by CNI, the Spanish Intelligence Service, December 2004

⁶ Briefing on Operation Crevice, SO 13, New Scotland Yard, December 2004

⁷ Al-Qaeda (Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 9 January 2004), p. 1. Available: <http://jtic.janes.com>.

⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda Global Network of Terror* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 2.

⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰ The 9/11 Commission Report provides insight into the operation including the different phases and time lines.

¹¹ Abdullah Azzam, “*Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah*,” *Al-Jihad*, 41, April 1988, p. 46. The original text in Arabic was translated into English by Reuven Paz, the then Academic Director, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel. Abdullah Azzam, *Iklan al-Jihad* (Peshawar, Pakistan : Maktab Khidmat al-Mujahidin), pp. 95 – 131.

¹² See published extracts from Ayman al-Zawahiri’s book, “*Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*” by Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 02 Dec, 2001, London.

¹³ “Syeikh Muhammad bin ‘Abdul Wahab (1115-1206H/1701-1790M)”, available at <http://media.isnet.org/islam/Etc/Wahab.html> (accessed 6 December 2004).

¹⁴ “Translation of Osama’s videotape”, *Al Jazeera TV*. 30 Oct. 2004.

¹⁵ Robert Fisk, “Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Ladin” *Independent* (London), July 10, 1996.

¹⁶ “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” *Al Islah* (London), Sept. 2, 1996.

¹⁷ “Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans,” *Al Quds Al Arabi* (London), Feb. 23, 1998. The fatwa argued that defensive jihad was necessary “in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem]

and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip [the US and Israel]

¹⁸ “Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah”. Translated by Reuven Paz from *Al-Jihad*; No. 41, April 1988, p. 46.

¹⁹ Al Qaeda Training manual recovered by the British Police in Manchester, n.d. n.p. p. 2.

²⁰ Gunaratna., p. 21.

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- ²¹ IDSS Commentaries, “Osama and Azzarqawi: Rivals or allies” by Bouchaib Silm, 55/2004, p. 2.
- ²² Gunaratna, p. 3.
- ²³ Ibid., p. 21.
- ²⁴ Interviews with Al Qaeda members, 1999-2.
- ²⁵ Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology”, CRS Report for Congress (Nov 16, 2004), pp. 5-6.
- ²⁶ Az Zawahiri videotape broadcasted by Al Jazeera, available at <http://alsaha.fares.net/sahat?128@209.WcGqojKhRA5.0@.1dd6a9e9>.
- ²⁷ “The Essence Of Al Qaeda: An Interview With Saad Al-Faqih”, The Jamestown Foundation, 04 Aug, 2004. Available at <http://www.ladlass.com/intel/archives/003908.html>.
- ²⁸ Jason Burke, “Think Again: Al Qaeda”, Foreign Policy (May/June 2004), p. 2. Available: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com> [2004, October 11]
- ²⁹ Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP – Pattani Mujahideen Movement). 31 Oct. 2002. Available at : <http://jtic.janes.com>.
- ³⁰ Of the original 3-4000 members at 2001, under 500 are still alive or active. ICPVTR database on Al Qaeda Wanted, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, August 2005.
- ³¹ Jason Burke, “Think Again: Al Qaeda”, Foreign Policy (May/June 2004), p. 1. Available: <http://www.foreignpolicy.com> [2004, October 11]
- ³² Interview, Keith Weston, Director, Police International Counter Terrorism Unit, Thames House, London, November 2004.
- ³³ Gunaratna, p. 5.
- ³⁴ Nat Hentoff, “Kangaroo court in Guantanamo Bay”, Chicago Sun-Times, 5 December 2004.
- ³⁵ ‘Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah’ (‘The General Guide For Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah’), International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2004. ICPVTR was the first institution to recover, fully translate, and analyze the JI guide.
- ³⁶ Debriefing of Hambali, Central Intelligence Agency, August 2003
- ³⁷ Debriefing of Hambali, Central Intelligence Agency, August 2003
- ³⁸ The meaning of the Quranic verse in Arabic, “And (tell them that) I have not created the invisible beings (jinn) and men to any end other than that they may (know and) worship me”, Q.S. 51: 56 in the PUPJI, Nidhom Asasi Muqaddimah, p. 13.
- ³⁹ “And lo! Thy Sustainer said unto the angels: “Behold, I am about to establish upon earth one who shall inherit it (khalifah)”, Q.S. 2:30.
- ⁴⁰ PUPJI, Muqaddimah, pp. 3 – 4 and Chapter 2, Article 4 of the Nidhom Asasi, p.14.
- ⁴¹ The phrase, ‘Jama’atun minal-Muslimin’ which appears in the PUPJI, Chapter 1, Article 2, p. 14 is a clear admission of this.
- ⁴² Martin van Bruinessen, ISIM, Netherlands in his ‘Traditionalist and Islamist pesantren in contemporary Indonesia’ a paper presented at the ISIM workshop on ‘The Madrasa in Asia’, 23 – 24 May 2004
- ⁴³ PUPJI, p. 13 and ‘Pidato Amanah Amirul Mujahidin Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’ read during the Mujahidin II Congress, 10-12 August 2003, published by Wihdah Press, Jogjakarta.
- ⁴⁴ Ushulul Manhaj Al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien’s seventh principle, PUPJI, p. 5 and Muhammad Saeed al-Qahtani, ‘Al Wala’ Wal Bara’ According To The Aqeedah Of The Salaf’ translated by Omar Johnstone available at www.islamworld.net/wal.html. Mentioned by Muhamad Nursalim in his Faksi Abdullah Sungkar Dalam Gerakan NII Era Orde Baru, thesis to meet the requirements of S2 (Master’s Degree) at Universitas Muhammadiyah Solo, 2001, p.22 as one of the two books which shaped Abdullah Sungkar’s Tauhid Paradigm.
- ⁴⁵ PUPJI, Chapter 10, Article 30 – 33, p.18.
- ⁴⁶ PUPJI, Chapter 2, Article 5, p.14. These are further explained in the documents, attached to the PUPJI under the titles, ‘Pembinaan Al-Iman’ pp 8-10, ‘Amar ma’ruf dan nahi munkar’pp 15-17, ‘At-Tarbiyah’pp 20-21, ‘Ad-Da’wah’pp 22-23, ‘Pembinaan Hijrah’pp 24-26 and ‘Pembinaan Jihad’pp 26-29.

⁴⁷ *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia*, ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002, p. 3.

⁴⁸ “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and The Threat of Terrorism”, White Paper published by Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore, 2003, pp. 15 -17.

⁴⁹ ‘Pidato Amanah Amirul Mujahidin Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’, pp. 5 – 6.

⁵⁰ ^CIshom Darbalah and ^CAshim ^CAbd al-Maajid. *Al-Qaul Al-Qathi^C Fi Man Imtana^Ca An Al-Syara^Ci*.

⁵¹ Dr Ahmad Mosuli. *Al-Ushuliah Al-Islamiah Dirasah Fi Al-Khitab Al-Ideoloji Wa Al-Siyasi^CInda Sayyid Qutb*. Egypt : Al-Tiba^Cah Wa Al-Nasyr Wa Al-Tauzee^C Wa Al-I^Clan, 1993, pp. 202 – 215.

⁵² PUPJI, pp. 5 – 6.

⁵³ White Paper, p. 17.

⁵⁴ Fauzan Al-Anshari. *Saya Teroris? (Sebuah “Pleidoi”)*. Jakarta Selatan : Penerbit Republika, 2002, p.7.

⁵⁵ White Paper, pp. 4 – 5 & 10.

⁵⁶ White Paper, p. 15.

⁵⁷ Dr. Zachary Abuza. (2003). *The State of Jemaah Islamiya and US Counter-Terror Efforts in Southeast Asia*. Available :

http://www.house.gov/international_relations/108/abuz1029.htm (2004, Oct 12).

⁵⁸ White Paper, p. 15.

⁵⁹ Interview, Abu Bakar Bashir, Central Prison, Jakarta, August 2005

⁶⁰ Debriefing of Hambali, Central Intelligence Agency, August 2003. Zulkarnaen is the current military commander of JI.

⁶¹ Debriefing of Hambali, Central Intelligence Agency, August 2003

⁶² In his inaugural statement Amirul Mujahidin Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, called for the Application of Islamic Law. He said: “We still believe that if the application of Islam law is not obstructed, there will be peaceful life in this nation. Everyone will get justice from Allah and get great benefit from the teachings of Muhammad. However, if the application of Islamic law is obstructed, and the aspiration of Muslim is unfairly blocked, Muslims have the right to fight. For MMI, there are only two alternatives: the application of Islamic law or death in the way of jihad fi sabilillah (jihad in the way of God).”

⁶³ Indonesia Backgrounder, How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, ICG Asia Report No. 43 Jakarta/Brussels, December 11, 2002, p.1.

⁶⁴ Interview Jack Roche, Hakea Prison, Perth, August 2004.

⁶⁵ At this point of time, there is only interest. The Asharq al Awsat reported that an Indonesian group recruited 300 volunteers to fight the Americans in Falluja, Iraq. Available at <http://www.asharqalawsat.com/> [2004, November 30]. Interviews with different jihad groups in Indonesia throughout 2005 revealed that there were jihadists that wanted to go to Iraq but lacked funds and the organization to travel.

⁶⁶ Most measures proposed to increase security are to contain terrorism such as access to high value detainees, ASEAN extradition treaty, create financial intelligence units; criminalize terrorist financing; increased cooperation between intelligence services and law enforcement agencies; and provision of incentives for job creation. Dr. Zachary Abuza, “The State of Jemaah Islamiya and US Counter-Terror Efforts in Southeast Asia”, pp. 12 - 14

⁶⁷ News Release, “New Team of Muslim World Experts at Institute”, *United States Institute of Peace*, 19 October, 2004.

⁶⁸ 9/11 Commission Report.

⁶⁹ These are the projects developed by Singapore’s International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.